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Abstract
This paper presents a model in which wages throughout the economy depend only on the labour
market conditions in some low-unemployment sector. In equilibrium, a labour demand shift
towards the primary sector tends to raise the unemployment rate everywhere else in the
economy and leaves wages unchanged. Overall this implies an increase in aggregate
unemployment. Based on SHIW micro data for the period 1977-1991 we find that wages in
Italy depend only on the tightness of the labour market in the North. We estimate that around
15% of the increase in aggregate unemployment in Italy can be explained by a shift in labour
demand in favour of the North not matched by an equal shift in labour supply.
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1.  Introduction
The unemployment rate in Italy grew roughly monotonically between the 70s and the early 90s,
increasing from about 7% in 1977 to 12% in 1992. In this respect, Italy does not differ from
many other continental European countries. What is peculiar to the Italian experience is that the
increase in the rate of unemployment was mainly concentrated in the less industrialized regions
of the South.1 While the typically low unemployment rate in the North stayed basically
untrended, going from 5% in 1977 to less than 6% in 1992, the unemployment rate in the South
doubled in this 15-year span, increasing from 10% in 1977 to 20% in 1992. The regions in the
middle of Italy, situated halfway between the Mezzogiorno and the North, started off with a
level of unemployment of 8% and ended with an increase of 2 percentage points. This is
illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1
.
Unemployment rates by region: Italy 1977-1992
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77 80 83 86 89 92
Notes. Source: Annuario Statistico Italiano, ISTAT, various issues.
                                                            
1. Throughout the paper the term ‘South’ refers to the Southern regions and the Islands (Sicily and Sardinia).
The aim of this paper is to evaluate whether the unbalanced evolution of labour demand and
supply across different geographical areas — for brevity labelled as ‘mismatch’ in what
follows — is partly responsible for the increase in aggregate unemployment.
In theory, a shift in labour demand towards the low-unemployment Northern regions and
away from the high-unemployment Southern region might explain part of the increase in the
aggregate rate of joblessness.  The mechanism we describe, despite having mainly a second
order effect, is theoretically and empirically fairly sound. Based on the original work by
Lipsey (1960) on the microfoundation of the Phillips curve, it is now widely accepted that
wages set by firms and workers are negatively affected by the rate of unemployment, whose
moderating influence, however, declines with its level.  If wages respond to changes in the
local unemployment rate, the more local unemployment rates are disperse, the higher the
average wage claim in the economy and, everything else being equal, aggregate unemployment.
Assuming fixed wage pressure, one would observe diverging local unemployment rates and
diverging relative wages.
When we turn to the Italian data, we observe that while regional unemployment rates
display increasing dispersion over the period, regional wages in Italy show instead a tendency
to converge, as it can be seen from Figure 2.  In 1977 workers in the North received 4% more
than the national average and those in the Middle and the South respectively 3% and 6% less.
By the end of the period, while those at the North received approximately the average wage,
the wage at the South and the Middle was respectively 3% less and 3% more than the national
average.
Figure 2
.
Relative wages by region: Italy 1977-1991
year
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Note: Three year moving averages plotted. See notes to Table 1.
At first glance, changes in relative wages across geographical areas correlate
positively with changes in relative unemployment, casting some doubts on whether a shift in net
relative demand across regions can be held responsible for the increase in aggregate
unemployment in Italy.  We will show anyway that, when the wage setting process is
dominated by the tightness of the labour market at the North, labour demand shifts across
regions may well imply stable unemployment in the North, rising unemployment in the rest of
the country, and stable regional wage differentials.
The intuition is straightforward: any rise in the demand for labour in the North will tend
to reduce the unemployment rate there and, via this, increase wage claims everywhere in the
economy.  In equilibrium, this implies a rise in the unemployment rate in the secondary sector
and stable wage differentials.
If, on top of this, there is an exogenous increase in wage pressure, pushing wage claims
in the secondary sector above those of the leading sector, the model can encompass both rising
unemployment differentials and increasing wage differentials, without exogenous wage
pressure being the main culprit of the rise in aggregate unemployment.
The question of whether a shift in labour demand carries the responsibility for the rise
in the aggregate rate of unemployment has relevant policy implications and lies at the core of
the present Italian debate on the performance of its labour market and increased disparities
between the North and the South.  Indirectly, the above hypothesis will be contrasted with the
widespread view that exogenous changes in wage pressure across regions bear the main
responsibility for the rise in Southern unemployment.  Although it is indisputable that some rise
in relative wage pressure occurred in the South, the point we want to address is whether this
can be blamed for all of the rise in unemployment.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. Section 2 provides a model for the analysis
of regional mismatch, based on a ‘leading-sector’ wage setting process. Section 3 estimates a
regional wage function for Italy over the period 1977-1991 using micro data from the Bank of
Italy Survey of Households’ Income and Wealth. This section provides evidence in favour of
an asymmetric wage setting model.  Section 4 resumes the arguments made in Section 2 and the
empirical results presented in Sections 3 to assess the role played by the regional imbalance
between demand and supply of labour in shaping the evolution of aggregate unemployment in
Italy.  Section 5 concludes and states the main findings.
2.  The Theoretical Framework
In this section we develop a simple two-sector model of the labour market, that illustrates how
sectoral demand and supply shocks can affect the aggregate unemployment rate when the wage-
setting mechanism is asymmetric across sectors, ie when the unemployment conditions
prevailing in one of the two sectors (the so called ‘leading sector’, which is generally the low-
unemployment one) determine wage claims throughout the economy.  Section 3 will provide
some evidence in favour of this model which is depicted in Figure 3. The symmetric model,
where sectoral wage claims only depend on the own-sector unemployment rate, is discussed in
Manacorda and Petrongolo (1998).
 We consider an economy in which the labour force is split into two sectors or —
equivalently — two categories of workers, identified with N1  and N2 , that jointly produce
some output Y.  Equilibrium in this economy is determined by the interaction of a labour
demand for each input and a corresponding wage-setting schedule.
On the labour demand side, we assume that technology is represented by a Cobb-
Douglas production function, combining the two types of labour under constant returns to scale
Y AN N= + =1 2 1 21 2 1
a a a a, (1)
in which A represents the aggregate state of technology.  Under perfect competition in the goods
market, the labour demand schedule for each type of labour is w Y Ni i i= a ( / ) , i = 1 2, , with
wi  denoting the real wage paid to input i and ai representing the share of total output accruing
to it. Expressing labour demand schedules in logarithms, we have
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for type 1, and similarly for type 2, where ui  denotes the unemployment rate of each type of
workers, and li  its labour force share.  Sector-specific demand and supply variables are
represented by a i  and li  respectively. They are in fact relative indicators
(a a1 2 1 2 1+ = + =l l ) and therefore are meant to isolate purely sectoral shocks from aggregate
changes.  In the following we assume that labour force changes are purely exogenous, ie we do
not allow for endogenous migration. This does not seem an unrealistic assumption for Italy
where, even in face of diverging local unemployment rates but still converging wages, internal
migration has declined steadily (see, among others, Faini et al, 1997).
When the ‘sectors’ considered are regions — as it is the case in the present analysis —
we can introduce an equivalent Cobb-Douglas aggregate welfare function where ai represents
the taste parameter associated to the output of the generic region i.2 This case is discussed in
Appendix A, where we show that both our model and its empirical implementation remain
unchanged.
Turning to wage setting, there is consensus on the recognition of a negative convex
relationship between wages set by workers and firms and the unemployment rate.  As pointed
out by Manning (1993), a wage equation of this kind can be obtained as a first order condition
for wages deriving from a bargaining problem between firms and workers. The literature on
the subject has identified two relevant models of sectoral wage behaviour (see Jackman and
Savouri, 1991), namely the ‘own-sector’ model and the ‘leading-sector’ model. The ‘own-
sector’ model, which is the one most often used to describe sectoral wage-setting, assumes that
wages set for each category of workers depend on their specific unemployment rate, generating
a symmetric mechanism of wage determination throughout the economy. The ‘leading-sector’
model assumes instead that the unemployment conditions prevailing in some leading sector of
the economy shape wage determination across all sectors. Supposing that sector 1 is the
leading or, equivalently, primary sector in the economy described, we will consider a sectoral
wage function such as
ln ln , ,w z u ii i= - =g 1 12 (3)
where wages set for each type of labour are a negative convex function of the unemployment
rate of type 1 workers. The parameter g  represents the absolute value of real wage elasticity
with respect to the unemployment rate of the primary sector. Although there is not constraint for
this to be the case, in order to keep things simple we have assumed the wage elasticity
parameter to be constant across sectors. Wage pressure factors, that affect sectoral wages at
                                                            
2.  We are grateful to Richard Jackman for having pointed this out.
given unemployment, are represented by the vector zi , which is allowed to vary across
sectors.
Wage-setting and labour demand can be then be combined for each group of workers in
order to eliminate wi . Total differentiation gives
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using the property that ( ) ( )[ ]d dln ln /a a a a1 1 1 11 1= - - .
A few things are worth mentioning.  First, unemployment in the primary sector
positively depends, other things being equal, on the unemployment rate of the secondary sector.
This derives from the fact that inputs are co-operant in the production function: higher
unemployment and therefore lower employment in one sector decreases marginal productivity
of labour in the other sector, therefore depressing demand and increasing unemployment. The
same effect can be found in the determination of unemployment in the secondary sector, and it
is represented by the term ( )[ ]a1 1 11/ - u du . However, u2  also depends on u1  because of a
feed-back effect deriving from the asymmetric wage-setting mechanism considered. A rise in
unemployment in the primary sector generates lower wage claims in the secondary sector and
therefore tends to reduce the secondary sector unemployment. This latter effect is represented
by ( )- g / u du1 1  and it dominates the former when ( )u1 1< +g g a/ .
A measure of the shift in relative labour demand across sectors net of shifts in relative
labour supply is given by the index
( ) ( )dmm d d l l dmm12 1 2 1 2 21= - = -ln / ln /a a (6)
where mm stands for ‘mismatch’. This has the desirable property of having the same absolute
magnitude and opposite signs for the two groups.
A convenient approximation to our index is
( ) ( )dmm d u u d w w12 2 1 1 2» - + ln / (7)
deriving from the first order Taylor approximation ( )d x xln 1- » , valid for x close to zero. In
partial equilibrium, any shift in the relative net demand will either imply an increase in the
difference between the local unemployment rates or a rise in relative wages.
Finally, let us define z  as the aggregate level of wage pressure, obtained as a weighted
average of group-specific wage pressure forces, in which the weights are given by shares of
output accruing to each input: z z z= +a a1 1 2 2 .  Along these lines we define dz dz dz= +a a1 1 2 2 ,
the change in aggregate wage pressure at constant factor shares.
The closed-form solution for du1and du2  is finally given by
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Equations (8) and (9) illustrate the effect of any exogenous shock on the unemployment
rate of the primary and the secondary sectors. One first observation concerns the fact that the
unemployment rate in the primary sector is solely affected by aggregate factors. In particular, it
is independent of sectoral demand and supply shocks. On the other hand, the unemployment rate
in the secondary sector is an increasing function of the net demand shift favouring the primary
sector.
To get a grasp of the model, observe that the negative effect on u1  (d u1 <0) of a relative
net demand shift towards sector 1 ( dmm12 >0) is perfectly offset by the resulting increase
brought about by the a rise in wage claims everywhere in the economy. This tends to make both
input prices relatively more costly and increase their unemployment. In equilibrium, the
unemployment rate in the leading sector comes back to its original level while the
unemployment rate in the secondary sector increases. As it can be seen from equation (3),
constant unemployment in sector 1 also implies constant relative wages across sectors.
Constant relative wages and increasing unemployment in one sector could only be rationalized
within a symmetric wage setting model in terms of an asymmetric demand shock coupled with
some change in wage pressure.  Here we have shown that, if wage setting is asymmetric, this
can also happen at fixed wage pressure.
Figure 3
The occurrence of a shift in net demand in an asymmetric wage-setting model
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Notes. The figure depicts the occurrence of a relative net demand shift in favour of
the leading sector of the economy (sector 1). We assume that wage pressure is equal
across the two sectors and that labour supply is given. Equilibrium in sector 1 is given
by the intersection of a common wage curve (W) and a downward sloping labour
demand schedule (D1), which jointly determine sector 1 employment (N1). This
determines the level of wages in both the leading and the secondary sector (w) and
the level of employment in the secondary sector (N2). The occurrence of a demand
shift against the unskilled shifts D1 up and D2 down.  As a first round effect, this
raises skilled employment and reduces unskilled employment. Wages grow. Because
of the two factors being co-operant in the production function, a reduction (increase)
in the equilibrium value of N2 (N1) tends to shift the demand curve back down (up).
While this second round effect is such to bring D1 back to its original level and leave
employment in the leading sector as well as wages all over the economy unchanged,
D2 shifts back only partially and employment in the secondary sector is reduced.
Both unemployment rates are positively affected by an excess aggregate wage pressure
dz over the feasible average wage growth. The feasible growth in the average wage is
measured by the increase in total factor productivity, d Aln , plus the growth in output that a
given sectoral productivity shock would produce at given relative employment:
( )ln N N d1 2 1a . This last term, although depending on da1 , cannot be interpreted as a pure
imbalance factor and therefore it is not included into the net relative demand shock. It
represents in fact the output gain (loss) that both types of labour enjoy (suffer) when sectoral
productivities change.
Finally, the unemployment rate in sector 2 depends positively on the wage pressure
differential dz dz2 1- . For the same reason described before, a change in wage pressure in the
leading sector will only affect the unemployment rate of the secondary sector.  A rise in
dz dz2 1-  first generates higher relative wages in sector 2, and therefore an increase in u2 and
a fall in u1.  The second round effect involves a rise in wage claims throughout the economy,
via the fall in u1, raising both unemployment rates.  The net effect is no change in u1 and an
increase in u2.
The aggregate unemployment rate u is given by a weighted average of sectoral
unemployment rates: u l u l u= +1 1 2 2 . The change in u is therefore computed as
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The term in dl1 in equation (10) is a compositional effect, due to migration of the labour force
from one unemployment group to the other. It tends to have a negative impact on aggregate
unemployment if there are net migration flows towards the primary sector, which is plausibly
the low-unemployment one.
Aggregate unemployment increases when aggregate wage pressure rises over the
feasible real wage, and when the change in wage pressure in the primary sector is lower than
the one in the secondary sector, this last effect being induced by the behaviour of unemployment
in sector 2.
Finally, aggregate unemployment is an increasing function of the net relative demand
shift favouring the leading sector. This happens because this kind of shock does not have
positive effects on the unemployment rate of the primary sector, while increasing
unemployment in the rest of the economy. The effect on aggregate unemployment is therefore
unambiguous.
Unlike in the symmetric wage-setting model, where the aggregate effects of sectoral
imbalances crucially depend on the fact that mismatch generates higher dispersion along a
convex wage-setting function, the curvature of the wage function does not play a crucial role in
this asymmetric wage setting model. Here mismatch simply works through the sensitivity of
wages in the economy to the unemployment in the primary sector.
Extending this framework to an n-sector economy, it can be shown (see Appendix B)
that the effect of sectoral mismatch on group specific unemployment is perfectly analogous to
the one in the two-sector case. Suppose that sector 1 is the leading sector, the relative
imbalance between demand and supply for the generic sector i can be written as
( ) ( )dmm d d l l i ni i i1 1 1 1= - =ln / ln / , ,...,a a , (11)
which is clearly zero for i = 1. Equations (8) and (9) rewrite then as
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Again, the unemployment in the leading sector will only be affected by aggregate
shocks. On top of this, sector specific unemployment rates will instead depend on the excess
wage pressure and shifts in net demand both measured relative to the leading sector.
Equations (12) and (13) are the basis of the empirical analysis of Section 4, where they
will be applied to a three-fold geographical classification for Italy.
3.  The Wage Setting Process in Italy
There is plenty of evidence (see Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994) that wages respond
negatively to local unemployment and that the relationship is convex in the wage-unemployment
space. The higher the local unemployment rate, the more workers are willing to moderate their
wage claims but as long as unemployment increases, this bites gradually less on wage claims.
In order to estimate a wage equation for Italy, we use individual data from the Bank of
Italy Survey of Households’ Income and Wealth (SHIW) (for a description see Brandolini,
1993, and Cannari and Gavosto, 1994). The survey has been run continuously from 1977 to
1984, then in 1986, 1987 and in every other year thereafter. Our estimates refer to the period
1977-1991, the longest time span in which we can have a consistent series for both wages and
unemployment. We restrict the analysis to full-year employees, aged 18-65. The sample
consists of 53,072 individuals.
One of the main advantages of the data set we use is that it includes individual-specific
variables, and in particular information on human capital characteristics of the individuals
(such as gender, age and education), alongside information on occupation and sector of
activity, although at some coarse degree of disaggregation.
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics on the data.  Compared to the other two
areas, the employed labour force at the North is relatively younger, on average less educated,
and composed by a higher proportion of blue collars and female workers. This is probably due
to the different industrial structure as well as to the non-random selection of the unemployed at
the Middle and especially at the South. Differences between the Middle and the South are of
similar qualitative nature but smaller in magnitude.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Means/proportions
Variables North Middle South
ln real wage 3.890 3.898 3.830
sex females 0.367 0.340 0.285
education no schooling 0.080 0.122 0.120
primary school 0.330 0.369 0.339
junior school 0.366 0.297 0.287
high school 0.210 0.193 0.219
university 0.014 0.019 0.035
age category 18-20 0.038 0.025 0.026
21-30 0.280 0.242 0.208
31-40 0.282 0.276 0.302
41-50 0.255 0.265 0.268
51-65 0.145 0.191 0.195
occupation blue collars 0.522 0.455 0.433
white collars 0.453 0.516 0.548
managers 0.024 0.029 0.019
number of observations 25,649 12,290 15,133
Notes. Source: SHIW individual records, 1977-1984, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991. Data are weighted by post-
stratification individual weights. Wages defined as take home annual pay net of taxes, social security
contributions and inclusive of bonuses, thirteenth wage and overtime payments. Wages are deflated using the
national consumer price index with base 1977. Selection criteria: full year employees, aged 18-65, with a
reported wage.
In what follows we try to determine whether regional wages are affected by regional
labour market conditions or whether it is the aggregate unemployment rate that matters. Also,
these hypotheses will be contrasted with the alternative hypothesis that wages are set according
to the labour market conditions prevailing in some leading sector of the economy.
The features of the Italian system of industrial relations suggest that wages in Italy might
be determined on the basis of the labour market conditions prevailing in the North.  This system
implies two different levels of wage setting: a national one and a local one. National
bargaining between the unions and the association of entrepreneurs determines minimum
binding wages for each industry. Within each industry, minima vary according to two main
parameters: occupation (inquadramento) and seniority. These minima extend automatically to
all workers whether unionized or not.  On top of this, individual or collective superminima can
be bargained at the firm level or conceded unilaterally by the employer. If, as many
commentators have argued, unions pursue an explicit egalitarian aim and value positively
equal proportional increases in wages everywhere in the economy, it would be rational for
unions to ask for wages to be linked to the tightness of the labour market in the low
unemployment-rate area of the North.  Suppose for a moment that wage increases were linked
to the labour market conditions at the South. This would imply a discontent on the part of the
workers at the North, who would see wages set at a level below the one implied by the labour
market conditions prevailing in their local labour market. Clearly, the question remains as to
why unions pursue an explicit egalitarian aim. One reason might be that, as the wage
distribution is skewed to the right, any policy aimed at those with wages below the average
will have the support of the median voter.
The existing evidence seems to give credit to this hypothesis.  Bodo and Sestito (1994),
based on average contractual wage rates for blue collars in manufacturing for the period 1960-
1991, find that the evolution of the unemployment rate in the North explains changes in wages
both in the North and in the South. They obtain the same result using firm-level data on average
earnings for blue collars for the period 1985-1990. Casavola, Gavosto and Sestito (1995)
estimate various specifications of a wage equation for Italy on a sample of small firms over the
period 1986-1993 and find that firm-level wages in the South are not affected by the local
unemployment rate, and only mildly affected by the local male unemployment rate. The
drawback of these studies is that they are not able to control for individual specific
characteristics.
To our knowledge, the only published study which controls for individual
characteristics is the one by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), who use data from the
International Social Survey Programme for the years 1986 and 1989. The authors find that
wages are responsive to labour market conditions but the result disappears when they control
for regional fixed effects. We argue below that this is a predictable result and — more
importantly — that any sensible specification of a wage equation should explicitly control for
these fixed effects.
The estimated equation has the form
ln ln *w c q trend u eit i it i t it= + + - +q b g (14)
where i refers to regions and t to years (t=1977-84, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991).
The dependent variable is the logarithm of cell-mean yearly labour income. Labour
income is defined as yearly earnings net of taxes and social contributions and inclusive of
overtime payments and bonuses. Wages are deflated using the national consumer price index
with base 1977.
The unemployment rate is labelled by the symbol u which in turn can be thought as the
local unemployment rate urt , the aggregate unemployment rate ut , or the leading-sector
unemployment rate uLt . The leading sector is identified with the Northern low-unemployment
area. Data on unemployment used throughout the analysis are the official ones published by the
Central Statistics Bureau (ISTAT).
All specifications include region-specific fixed effects ci  and control for a number of
observable characteristics of the individuals, namely sex, age, education, and occupation, all
included in the vector qit . We decided not to introduce industry controls in the equation, on the
grounds that any relative shift in the industrial structure between regions should be embodied in
our mismatch indicator. Nonetheless, the exclusion of these variables does not bear any
substantial difference in terms of our estimates. Estimation on cell-means implies using
proportions of individuals into each category (by sex, age, education, occupation) as relevant
conditioning variables. Given that these proportions are not constant over time, the vector of
controls qit is also time-varying. One should be careful in interpreting coefficients on
proportions: not only do these pick up the marginal effect of the variable on the level of
individual wages, ie according to the standard interpretation, the price of individuals’
marketable characteristics, but also any indirect effect due to the varying proportions of
employees with different skills through demand and supply mechanism. To understand this,
suppose there is a male-female wage gap purely due to discrimination. At fixed prices, a rise
in the proportion of women in the labour force reduces the average wage in two ways.  On the
one hand there is a direct effect due to increased proportion of relatively lower paid workers.
On top of this, if they compete with equally productive male workers and are preferred by
employees because of their lower wage, firms will tend to substitute away from male workers
towards female ones.  This further pushes the average wage down. Lastly, if one is prone to
assume that increased supply of female workers reduces their wages, this is a third potential
source of variation in an aggregate wage function.
 Changes in sector-specific wage pressure are picked up by linear trends, which are
allowed to have a different coefficient for each region.  In these regressions we also tried to
allow for different coefficients on unemployment across different regions.  Unfortunately,
insufficient variation made our coefficients poorly identified.
As noted in the study by Jackman and Savouri (1991), one would also like to include
macroeconomic variables affecting wages at given unemployment. The general procedure is to
include year dummies. This allows one to remove a common mean which is bound to pick up
the secular and cyclical changes that are common to all regions. Unfortunately, when other
cross-section invariant variables are included in the regression, year dummies need to be
excluded in order to identify the model. This is clearly the case when a common rate of
unemployment — whether aggregate or the leading sector’s — enters equation (14).
The wage equation is first estimated on ten regional aggregates, the finest possible
regional disaggregation with our data, and the results are then replicated on three regional
aggregates (North, South and Middle). While we wish to estimate the components of wage
determination at the three-fold classification level, little variation is left to identify precisely
the regression coefficient. Our hope is to show that the results are robust to the level of
aggregation used, and that some lack of identification when individual observations are
collapsed into three regional aggregates simply stems from the absence of sufficient time series
variation.
In Table 2a we report the estimation results for the wage equation on ten regional aggregates.
Ten regional dummies are present in all our specifications, so to exploit time variation to
identify our coefficient on log unemployment. Omission of regional dummies constantly
reinforces our results, providing negative and highly significant estimates of the coefficient on
the ln urt  term. When regional dummies are omitted this coefficient mainly picks up the
negative cross-sectional correlation between local unemployment rates and real wages, namely
the circumstance that where unemployment is higher (in the South), wages are on average
lower. An F-test of equality of the regional effects, both across the whole of Italy and within
the three macro regions, leads systematically to rejection of the null.
All specifications include linear trends for the three macro regions. Estimation was
initially performed with ten regional specific trends but an F-test on the equality of the
coefficients on linear trend within the three macro-regions (North, South and Middle) leads to
acceptance of the null hypothesis. We are instead unable to reject equality of the coefficients on
the three linear trends between the three macro-areas. Although wage pressure terms are not
significantly different from zero, the differences among them are in fact significant and in
particular there is some evidence of a higher specific wage pressure growth in the South.
Columns I, II and III estimate each wage-setting model in turn, excluding aggregate
controls.  Column I estimates a simple regional equation, where (log) wages only depend on
the (log) local unemployment rate. In column II we estimate a leading sector model with the
unemployment rate at the North as an explicative variable, while in column III we report a
specification with the aggregate unemployment rate as a regressor. In all of the three case, the
unemployment variable enters the equation with a positive sign. The results suggest, if any,
some form of endogeneity at work. Any increase in wage pressure would push both the
unemployment rate and wages up. In columns V and VI we control for aggregate disturbances.
In column IV we include the three unemployment rates in the regression, in order to
check whether potential correlation among these might have affected our previous estimates.
The coefficient on Northern unemployment becomes negative and significant, while local
unemployment has no effect on regional wages. Aggregate unemployment comes in with a
positive sign. This kind of perverse effect of aggregate unemployment when different
unemployment measures are included simultaneously is also found in Jackman, Layard and
Savouri (1991). As they note, aggregate unemployment may stand as a proxy for unobserved
aggregate supply shocks, that tend to raise aggregate unemployment as well as wages all over
the country. This mechanism is likely to be responsible for the positive coefficient on lnut  in
any of our regressions.
In columns V-VII we include possible proxies for aggregate performance with either the
local or the leading-sector unemployment rate in turn.  In columns V and VI the own-sector
wage setting model is tested. As argued above, one control for aggregate factors is naturally
represented by the aggregate unemployment rate. Column V shows that, when lnut  is included,
both unemployment variables are non significant. Alternatively, when all possible aggregate
factors are controlled for using time dummies (column VI), the effect of local unemployment is
insignificantly differently from zero.
In column VII a similar exercise is replicated using the leading-sector unemployment
rate. The only available control for aggregate disturbances to wages is represented by the
aggregate unemployment rate, given that the insertion of time dummies would make the model
unidentifiable. Using this aggregate control gives a negative and significant elasticity of
regional wages with respect to the unemployment rate in the North. Overall, the elasticity of
wages with respect to the unemployment rate in the North is estimated to be in the order of
14%.
Table 2a
Regional wage equation for Italy: 1977-1991 - Ten regional aggregates
(dependent variable: logarithm real regional wages)
Specification
Variables I II III IV V VI VII
ln unemployment local .012 -0.030 -.045 -.033
rate (029) (.037) (.038) (.037)
aggregate 0.123(.062)
0.449
(.136)
0.189
(.082)
0.423
(.132)
North 0.017(.026)
-0.130
(.055)
-0.138
(.054)
sex female=1 -0.476(.141)
-0.468
(.140)
-0.454
(.138)
-0.415
(.136)
-0.423
(.140)
-0.380
(.139)
-0.434
(.134)
age category 21-30 0.860(.396)
0.882
(.393)
0.924
(.385)
1.068
(.382)
1.019
(.392)
1.425
(.405)
1.011
(.375)
31-40 0.621(.383)
0.616
(.378)
0.610
(.367)
0.880
(.372)
0.714
(.376)
1.308
(.413)
0.824
(.365)
41-50 0.824(.402)
0.851
(.396)
0.890
(.388)
1.066
(.391)
1.012
(.401)
1.481
(.423)
0.991
(.378)
51-65 0.726(.399)
0.731
(.391)
0.738
(.380)
1.023
(.389)
0.869
(.394)
1.409
(.417)
0.949
(.377)
education primaryschool
0.090
(.357)
0.107
(.348)
0.086
(.341)
0.189
(.342)
0.188
(.351)
0.192
(.346)
0.124
(.331)
junior
school
-0.064
(.321)
-0.076
(.315)
-0.145
(.303)
0.063
(.308)
-0.049
(.313)
0.042
(.311)
0.008
(.300)
high
school
0.369
(.329)
0.348
(.330)
0.288
(.318)
0.479
(.317)
0.347
(.321)
0.480
(.323)
0.449
(.314)
university 0.095(.359)
0.074
(.360)
-0.010
(.349)
0.135
(.344)
0.044
(.351)
0.184
(.360)
0.105
(.342)
occupation whitecollars
0.109
(.121)
0.127
(.124)
0.149
(.120)
0.103
(.120)
0.166
(.120)
-0.033
(.161)
0.089
(.118)
managers 1.592(.468)
1.661
(.482)
1.813
(.472)
1.807
(.467)
1.908
(.477)
1.477
(.499)
1.740
(.458)
linear trend aggregate 0.006(.002)
0.006
(.002)
0.002
(.003)
-0.010
(.005)
0.000
(.003)
0.006
(.002)
-0.009
(.005)
 Middle 0.006(.002)
0.006
(.002)
0.006
(.002)
0.005
(.002)
0.006
(.002)
0.005
(.002)
0.005
(.002)
 South 0.006(.002)
0.006
(.002)
0.007
(.002)
0.007
(.003)
0.008
(.003)
0.007
(.003)
0.006
(.002)
constant 3.034(.456)
3.010
(.445)
2.807
(.445)
2.807
(.518)
2.555
(.491)
2.406
(.454)
2.218
(.489)
year dummies 3
regional effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Adj. R2 0.8262 0.8267 0.8337 0.8431 0.8345 0.8484 0.8438
Notes. Regressions are run on regional observation (ten-fold classification: (1) Piemonte - Val d’Aosta -
Liguria, (2) Lombardia, (3) Trentino Alto Adige - Veneto - Friuli Venezia Giulia, (4) Emilia Romagna, (5)
Toscana - Umbria - Marche, (6) Lazio, (7) Campania, (8) Abruzzi - Molise - Puglia, (9) Basilicata - Calabria,
(10) Sicilia -Sardegna. Control group: region 1, no education, blue collar, male, aged 18-20. Number of
observations: 110. 1987 excluded because 10-fold disaggregation not available. Estimation method:
generalised least squares, with observations weighted by cell size. Standard errors in brackets. See notes to
Table 1.
To check whether the unemployment rate at the North is simply picking up the effect of the
economic cycle, we have inserted in specification VII the rate of growth of real GDP as an
additional regressor. The test (not reported in the table for brevity) confirms our previous
findings: the coefficients on the two unemployment rates remain substantially unchanged in
magnitude and significance, while the business cycle variable does not enter the equation
significantly.
Concerns for a possible simultaneity bias in equation (14) would lead to the use of
instrumental variables for the unemployment rate. Equations estimated using lagged
unemployment (both the Northern and the aggregate one) as instruments for current
unemployment do not produce any remarkable difference in the results. In particular, when
estimating specification VII, we obtain a coefficient of -.191 (s.e. .068) on Northern
unemployment and a coefficient of .498 (s.e. .167) on aggregate unemployment.
As wage pressure is concerned, Table 2a shows that the aggregate unemployment rate
enters almost all our equations significantly and with a positive sign, which we interpreted in
terms of the unemployment rate acting as a proxy for aggregate wage pressure, above the one
represented by the linear trend. Regional trends allow instead to pick up any change in region-
specific wage pressure. Aggregate wage pressure, as captured by the aggregate unemployment,
which rises by 4% a year between 1977 and 1991, implies in turn an average annual rise in
wages across all regions of 1.7%.  In other words, most of the wage pressure in Italy in the
period 1977-1991 had an aggregate nature.  Still, there is evidence of a faster growth of wages
at the Middle and the South as compared to the North.
As the other controls are concerned, sex, age and occupation variables enter the
different specifications with the expected sign.  The different modalities of each of these
variables turn out to be jointly significant at standard acceptance levels. While no smooth age
profile can be detected, it must be emphasised that the age variable picks up both pure age (or
seniority) effects as well as cohort effects, in turn due to varying demographics as well as to
macroeconomic shocks affecting entrants in the labour markets at a same point in time. As the
education variable is concerned, it must be noted that the coefficients turn out to be unstable
across specifications and individually not significant. If any, these regressions show that there
is no clear sign of returns to education in Italy.
In Table 2b we replicate the results so far presented on three regional macro-
aggregates only. The general pattern is that our results on the effect of unemployment on wage
determination are fairly robust to the degree of aggregation. Since 19 coefficients are estimated
on 36 data points, it should not come as a surprise that the estimates are not particularly
precise. In our preferred specification VII, the coefficients on the unemployment rates both at
the North and nation-wide remain remarkably similar to those in Table 2a, albeit their standard
errors increase.
Table 2b
Regional wage equation for Italy: 1977-1991-Three regional aggregates
(dependent variable: logarithm real regional wages)
Specification
Variables I II III IV V VI VII VIII
ln unemployment
rate local
0.117
(.042)
0.055
(.057)
0.044
(.061)
0.069
(.086)
aggregate 0.223(.068)
0.406
(.156)
0.166
(.104)
0.464
(.144)
.514
(.126)
North 0.071(.038)
-0.137
(.070)
-0.130
(.070)
-.153
(.049)
sex female=1 -0.932(.467)
-0.830
(.509)
-0.799
(.439)
-0.784
(.420)
-0.852
(.452)
-0.772
(.731)
-0.722
(.414)
.077
(.341)
age category 21-30 0.944(.738)
1.444
(.784)
1.391
(.678)
1.109
(.677)
1.218
(.729)
1.383
(1.335)
1.328
(.637)
31-40 0.177(.690)
0.650
(.712)
0.653
(.608)
0.607
(.639)
0.441
(.683)
0.816
(1.444)
0.860
(.581)
41-50 0.476(.753)
1.123
(.774)
1.123
(.669)
0.874
(.708)
0.871
(.764)
1.117
(1.475)
1.185
(.627)
51-65 0.733(.748)
1.204
(.774)
1.092
(.661)
1.045
(.676)
0.893
(.725)
1.342
(1.512)
1.283
(.627)
education primaryschool
-1.924
(.764)
-1.462
(.819)
-1.263
(.712v
-1.332
(.730)
-1.483
(.784)
-1.510
(.990)
-1.068
(.675)
junior
school
-1.677
(.663)
-1.333
(.699)
-1.198
(.587)
-1.032
(.640)
-1.402
(.659)
-0.949
(.919)
-0.797
(.590)
high
school
-1.257
(.665)
-1.137
(.726)
-0.882
(.618)
-0.578
(.649)
-1.021
(.656)
-0.361
(.968)
-0.428
(.628)
university -1.034(.623)
-0.993
(.684)
-0.919
(.586)
-0.754
(.567)
-0.977
(.599)
-0.478
(.783)
-0.694
(.562)
occupation whitecollars
0.089
(.172)
0.212
(.204)
0.212
(.169)
0.059
(.175)
0.184
(.175)
-0.330
(.487)
0.099
(.169)
.272
(.115)
managers 0.574(.869)
1.450
(1.035)
1.952
(.909)
1.473
(.975)
1.590
(1.050)
0.534
(1.450)
1.925
(.852)
2.45
(.661)
linear trend aggregate 0.007(.003)
0.008
(.004)
-0.001
(.004)
-0.009
(.007)
0.001
(.005)
0.002
(.007)
-0.011
(.007)
-.012
(.005)
 Middle 0.009(.003)
0.008
(.003)
0.008
(.003)
0.007
(.003)
0.009
(.003)
0.007
(.004)
0.006
(.003)
.006
(.002)
 South 0.005(.003)
0.008
(.003)
0.009
(.003)
0.006
(.003)
0.007
(.003)
0.007
(.004)
0.008
(.003)
.007
(.002)
regional effects Middle -0.199(.047)
-0.143
(.043)
-0.141
(.036)
-0.154
(.046)
-0.165
(.050)
-0.151
(.060)
-0.125
(.035)
-.069
(.018)
South -0.339(.062)
-0.247
(.054)
-0.236
(.046)
-0.260
(.067)
-0.275
(.072)
-0.257
(.096)
-0.212
(.045)
-.126
(.030)
constant 4.876(.920)
4.060
(.935)
3.577
(.811)
3.456
(1.000)
4.025
(1.032)
3.874
(1.458)
2.931
(.835)
2.864
(.219)
year dummies 3
Adj. R2 .9087 .8905 .9181 .9278 .9159 .8968 .9281 .9173
Notes. Regressions are run on regional observation (three-fold classification: North, Middle and South).
Control group: North, no education, blue collar, male, aged 18-20. Number of observations: 36. Estimation
method: generalised least squares, with observations weighted by cell size. Standard errors in brackets. See
notes to Table 1.
An F test on the occupation dummies in column VII leads to a rejection of the null with
a p-value of 3.5%. The same cannot be said for the education and age dummies. In column VIII
we re-estimate a wage function simply with controls for occupation. The coefficients stay
basically unchanged but are much more precisely estimated.  Overall, a point estimate of .13-
.15 seems a good picture of the data.
As a last check for the robustness of our results, we have substituted in turn the
unemployment rate at the Middle and at the South for the unemployment rate at the North, both
in specifications VII and VIII. In neither case, these unemployment rates turn out to be
significant.
If we now look at the extremely parsimonious specification VIII, we can gauge some
information on wage pressure.  There is clear evidence of a lower level of wage pressure at
the South. Conditional on the occupational structure, wages in the South in 1977 were 12%
lower than the national average. Gradually, the gap has been reducing, with wage pressure
growing faster in the Middle and the South. Overall, these trends are able to explain an average
annual rise in wages relative to the North in the order of .7% and .6% respectively.  Blunt
regressions of the wage differentials on a linear trend without further controls bear a
coefficient respectively of .5% and .7% , both statistically indistinguishable from the point
estimates in column VIII. This suggests that all of the changes in wage differentials are to be
blamed on increased wage pressure, but this does not imply, by any means, that the latter is the
only responsible for the rise in unemployment differentials.
4.  The Effect of Regional Mismatch on Aggregate Unemployment
We started by observing the remarkable difference in the evolution of the unemployment rates
in the three broad geographical areas of the country. While in the period 1977-1991 the
dispersion of regional unemployment rates increased, along with a generalised increase in the
aggregate unemployment rate, wages showed a tendency to converge.  In Section 3 we
provided evidence for a leading-sector model of wage determination, in which wages are set
nation-wide on the basis of the unemployment rate prevailing in the North.
The next step is to evaluate the impact of the evolution of net relative labour demand
shifts across areas on aggregate unemployment. As we discussed in Section 2, in a leading
sector model shifts in net demand in favour of the leading sector imply, everything else being
equal, an increase in aggregate unemployment. We can now measure the shifts in labour
demand and labour supply in each of the areas and estimate the effect of these changes on
aggregate unemployment.
Table 3 reports the average share over time of the employed population, the labour
force and the wage bill in the three regional aggregates. Workers at the North account for about
half of the employed population while those at the South for about one-third.
Table 3
Average shares of employment, labour force and wage bill
Employment Labour force Wage bill
n/N l/L a
North .502 .484 .513
Middle .194 .194 .200
South .304 .322 .287
Notes. Source for employment, unemployment and labour force: Annuario Statistico Italiano, ISTAT, various
issues. Data on wages are obtained from SHIW (see notes to table 1).
In Table 4 we report the evolution of the demand and the supply of labour in the three
geographical areas, measured in terms of annual growth rates, obtained as coefficients on a
linear trend of the series of logarithms between comparable points along the cycle, ie the two
peaks of 1979 and 1988.  We simply fit a linear regression estimated on the observations in
1978, 1979, 1980 1987 and 1989.
In column I we report the rate of growth of the employment share of each type of
workers: relative employment decreases at the North and, to a lesser extent at the South, but
increases in the Middle. When data are weighted by relative wages, this gives the growth rate
in the wage bill accruing to each input (d ln(a)), reported in column II.  As we discussed in
Section 2, under the assumptions of constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas technology and
perfect competition in the product market, this measure is proportional to the marginal
productivity of each input and represents an adequate demand index. Column III contains the
rate of growth in the labour force share of each group (d ln(l)). This is our supply indicator.
Finally, column IV reports the indicator of imbalance between demand and supply, defined as
the difference between the rate of growth in demand and the rate of growth in supply (d ln(a) -
d ln(l)).
Table 4
Annual growth rates in demand and supply (x 100)
Employment
(I)
Demand
(II)
Supply
(III)
Demand-Supply
(IV)=(II)-(III)
dln(n) d ln(a) d ln(l) d ln(a)
-d ln(l)
North -.105 -.357 -.470 .113
Middle .388 .430 .142 .288
South -.077 .347 .614 -.267
Notes. Growth rates evaluated as coefficients of a regression of the relevant variable in logarithm on a linear
trend between comparable points along the business cycle. See main text for details.
The relative wage share falls in the North with a total reduction of almost 5% over the
14-year period. Relative demand grows instead in the Middle and — to a lesser extent in the
South — with an overall increase respectively of 6% and 5% from 1977 to 1991.
Differences in labour supply across regions are also noteworthy. The labour force share grows
by almost 9% in the Mezzogiorno while it decreases by almost 7% in the North. The growth in
the Middle is in the order of 2%. Although both demand and supply decrease in the North, the
net outcome is a growth in net demand of about 1.5% in 14 years. Both labour demand and
labour supply increase in the Middle but the former outpaces the latter and the net result in an
overall increase of 4%. Net demand decreases instead the South, with an overall decrease of
about 4%.
We can now assess the effect of regional imbalances between labour demand and
supply on total unemployment. Table 5 reports the results of this exercise. Column I reports the
actual changes in the unemployment rate in the three geographical areas and in the aggregate
economy, using the same procedure for peak-to-peak changes described above. The
unemployment rate in the South increases as much as almost 7 times the unemployment rate in
the North, with an increase of around 1 percentage point a year.
Columns II to IV report the estimation of the effect of regional mismatch on each local
unemployment rate and finally on aggregate unemployment, according to equation (13)
evaluated at the starting value for the aggregate unemployment rate. Column II displays the
coefficient on the mismatch term, which is simply the time average of ui - 1 . The mismatch
indicator is obtained from Table 4 subtracting the imbalance indicator in the North (the leading
sector) from the regional imbalance in the generic region i.  This corresponds to our mismatch
indicator reported in equation (11). Shifts in demand and supply imply an increase in
unemployment at the South but a reduction at the Middle. The implied aggregate variation in
unemployment is obtained by weighting the estimated changes in local unemployment by
average labour force shares in each area, reported in column V. In the aggregate, regional
mismatch explains an annual average rise in unemployment of about 0.7 percentage points,
approximately 15 per cent of the total increase in aggregate unemployment.
Table 5
The impact of regional imbalance between demand and supply on unemployment
Annual changes in unemployment rate
du (*100)
Labour force
shares
Actual Estimated
(I)
Coefficient
(ui-1)
(II)
Mismatch
d ln(ai/a1) -
d ln(li/l1)
(III)
Coefficient *
mismatch
(IV)
=(II) * (III)
(V)
North .159 -.936 0 0 .484
Middle .262 -.911 .175 -.159 .194
South 1.0341 -.856 -.381 .326 .322
TOTAL .483 .074
Notes. See notes to table 4. Numbers obtained by evaluating equations (12) and (13) on data
5.  Conclusions
Starting from the observation that the secular growth in unemployment in Italy in the last two
decades was mainly concentrated in the Mezzogiorno, we have evaluated the impact of
regional imbalances between demand and supply of labour across geographical areas on
aggregate unemployment.
In Section 2 we have presented a simple non-competitive model of the labour market,
where wages are set on the basis of the unemployment conditions prevailing in some leading
sector of the economy. Assuming, for simplicity, that the demand equation comes from a Cobb-
Douglas specification of the production function and that the market for final goods is perfectly
competitive, it turns out that in equilibrium sectoral imbalances only affect the unemployment
rate in the secondary sector. Any demand shift in favour of the primary sector implies, coeteris
paribus, an increase in the aggregate unemployment rate via an increase in the unemployment
rate in the secondary sector.
In Section 3 we have estimated a regional wage equation for Italy over the period 1977-
1991 using the SHIW. We reject a model of ‘own-sector’ wage determination and find that
nation-wide wages are affected by labour market conditions prevailing in the low-
unemployment area of the North. We have estimated that an increase of 10% in the
unemployment rate in the North implies a decrease of about 1.3% in nation-wide real wages.
We have also found evidence of increasing region-specific wage pressure at the South. This
helps to rationalize the converging trends in relative wages across areas and the increasing
unemployment at the South.
Building on these premises, in Section 4 we have estimated the impact of regional
labour demand and supply imbalances on aggregate unemployment. It emerges that while both
demand and supply decline in the North, the opposite happens in the South and the Middle.
However, labour supply falls more rapidly than demand in the North and, to a larger extent, in
the Middle. In the South supply grows more rapidly than the demand and on balance net
demand decreases. We estimate the effect of the increasing regional imbalance being
responsible for approximately 15 per cent of the total increase in aggregate unemployment in
Italy over the period of observation.
Appendix A:
The case of regional mismatch
In Section 2 we discuss a two-sector model of the labour market where the technology is
represented by a Cobb-Douglas production function in the two inputs. This case applies to the
analysis of mismatch, say, by skill or industry. When the ‘sectors’ considered are regions we
could introduce an equivalent constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas aggregate utility function
V Y Y= + =F 1 2 1 21 2 1
a a a a, (A1)
where ai represents the taste parameter associated to output Yi of the generic region i and F  is
a shift parameter. Under the assumption that regional labour markets are perfectly competitive,
in equilibrium the marginal utility of each regional product Y, must equal its price
¶
¶
V
Y
p
i
i= . (A2)
It follows that the parameters ai bear the straightforward interpretation of aggregate
expenditure shares devoted to the consumption of the good YI
ai
i ip Y
p Y p Y
=
+1 1 2 2
. (A3)
Let us assume that production in each region is represented by a linear technology, with
capital in the background,
Y A Ni i i= (A4)
where Ai is a technology parameter and Ni is employment. Under the assumption of perfectly
competitive labour markets, the real wage in region i is given by
w
p
Ai
i
i= (A5)
Substituting (A4) and (A5) into (A3), it follows
ai
i iw N
w N w N
=
+1 1 2 2
(A6) 
In equilibrium, the taste parameters in the aggregate utility function equal the share of the wage
bill wage accruing to each regional labour input. Equation (A6) justifies therefore the use of ai
as a relative indicator of the demand for region i even in the case of regional mismatch.
Appendix B:
Three input case
Consider a Cobb-Douglas production function in three labour inputs
Y AN N N= + + =1 2 2 1 2 3
1 2 3 1a a a a a a, (B1)
where we have assumed constant returns to scale. On the wage determination side, assume that
wages only respond to the labour market conditions in the leading sector 1
ln ln , , ,w z u ii i= - =g 1 1 2 3 (B2)
 Under perfect competition, wages equal marginal productivity
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and
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and similarly for input 3.
It is convenient to rewrite the labour demand for secondary sectors (2 and 3) as follows
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and analogously for the third sector.
By eliminating w from (B2) and (B3), and differentiating, it turns out that for input 1
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using the property
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For input 2 (but an analogous expression can be obtained for input 3)
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using the property
( )d d dln ln lna a a
a
a
a
a2 2
2
1
3
3
1
1= - - . (B9)
Collecting terms, we have
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From which
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By inverting the matrix H
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and letting
dz dz dz dz= + +a a a1 1 2 21 3 3 (B16)
it is straightforward to derive equation (10) and (11).
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